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TESTING THE MAN-RATED LAUNCH VEHICLE
Francis X. Carey
Martin Company 
Cocoa Beach, Florida
Although manned space flight is still in 
its infancy, testing of launch vehicles 
has progressed to a high degree of so­ 
phistication.
As of December 1965, the Martin-built 
Gemini launch vehicle has launched 
seven Gemini spacecraft successfully 
out of seven attempts. This remarkable 
record was made possible by two facts:
1. The basic reliability of the 
hardware
2. The test program.
This paper briefly describes the Gemini 
launch vehicle noting the major differ­ 
ences between it and the Titan II and 
discusses the test program. It is not 
proposed that this is the only method 
of testing a man-rated launch vehicle; 
however, it is a successful one.
The Gemini launch vehicle is a basic 
Air Force Titan II which has been modi­ 
fied in certain areas to achieve man- 
rating (see Figure 1).
Launch Vehicle Man-Rating
Man-rating is the philosophy and plan 
for marshaling the disciplines necess­ 
ary to achieve a satisfactory proba­ 
bility of mission success and crew 
survival. This probability may be 
expressed in terms of reliability of 
the malfunction detection and escape 
systems. Mathematically, these terms 
are linked in the equation:
= RLV *MDS
where:
PCS
RT XT
= probability of crew survival
= reliability of the launch 
vehicle
= reliability of the malfunction 
detection and escape systems.
From this mathematical relationship, it 
can be seen that achieving a satisfactory 
level of probability of crew survival 
required that careful consideration be 
given to such launch vehicle items as:
1. Component and/or system, redundancy 
which can improve the reliability 
of the launch vehicle
2. Analysis of launch vehicle failure 
modes followed by design of a re­ 
liable malfunction detection system 
or MDS
3. Functional utilization of the crew 
as part of the malfunction detection 
system
4. Emphasis in launch vehicle checkout 
on minimizing the possibility of 
launching a bad vehicle
5. Test, countdown, and launch proced­ 
ures that will lead to maximum 
probability of launching a good 
vehicle
6. System simplification where possible 
to achieve reliability.
Man-rating a Titan II is a many-sided 
process conceived by Martin and the Air 
Force to improve the reliability of the 
basic vehicle by modifying existing sys­ 
tems, by using redundant components, by 
adding special systems for crew safety 
purposes, by special handling of critical 
components, by meticulous selection of 
qualified people, and by developing pro­ 
cedures in the entire design-production- 
manufacturing-test-launch cycle that es­ 
tablishes as a goal flawless performance 
from the launch vehicle.
Titan II Modifications for Gemini
The high reliability of the ultimate man- 
rated Gemini-Titan launch vehicle was the 
result of two decisions made early in the 
program by Martin and Air Force engineers--
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first, to make as few changes as possible 
in the basic Titan II and secondly, to 
make every necessary change count toward 
overall reliability. Each of the modifi­ 
cations added to reliability and safety 
and contributed to man-rating.
The major modifications, accepted only 
after careful review by a top level Air 
Force-Martin engineering board, were:
1. The addition of a malfunction de­ 
tection system designed to sense 
problems in any of the vital 
booster systems and transmit this 
information to the astronaut crew
2. A redundant flight control system 
which could take over should the 
primary system fail in flight
3. Redundancy in the electrical sys­ 
tem with necessary changes to 
provide power for such added 
launch vehicle equipment as the 
MDS
4. Substitution of radio guidance
for inertial guidance used in the 
Titan II ICBM version to provide 
a weight reduction and also to 
provide a more responsive system 
during critical orbital injection
5. Redundancy in the hydraulic sys­ 
tems where desirable for pilot 
sa±£ry, sucn as hydraulic actua­ 
tors for engine gimbaling
6. Instrumentation to provide addi­ 
tional data during pre-flight 
checkout and flight not considered 
necessary in the ICBM version.
Malfunction Detection System
The malfunction detection system (MDS) 
(Figure 2) is perhaps the most signifi­ 
cant modification made to Titan II to 
prepare it for the manned Gemini mis­ 
sion. The MDS monitors operation of 
vital launch vehicle subsystems and 
signals the spacecraft crew if a mal­ 
function takes place. The Gemini-Titan 
MDS is comparable in function to the 
launch vehicle ASIS (Abort Sensing and 
Implementation System) of Project Mercury
with one important exception: ASIS was 
completely automatic (after a serious 
malfunction was discovered, ASIS auto­ 
matically initiated mission abort), 
while MDS only provides vehicle condi­ 
tion information to the astronauts. In 
other words, MDS signals to the astronaut 
the proper or improper functioning of the 
launch vehicle and allows him to make the 
decision as to whether to continue the 
mission in the event of a malfunction or 
when to abort the mission if this should 
become necessary. Only in the event of 
an engine hardover condition does the MDS 
automatically act and in this case, only 
to switch over to redundant hydraulic, 
flight control, and electrical systems, 
not to abort the mission. As a result, 
the MDS is a relatively simple system 
with a high degree of reliability. It 
takes advantage of one of the lessons of 
Project Mercury - that man can function 
in space as a working pilot, not just as 
a passenger in his spacecraft. The MDS, 
which is completely redundant, monitors 
during flight: propellant tank pressures, 
staging of the launch vehicle, thrust 
chamber pressures, electrical system volt­ 
age, and turning rates which would indi­ 
cate a need for action if the launch 
vehicle structural limits are approached.
Hydraulic System
The launch vehicle's hydraulic systems 
control the position of the Stage I and 
Stage II rocket engine thrust chambers 
in response to electrical signals from 
the flight control system. Changing the 
thrust direction in this manner, the 
launch vehicle is steered along the de­ 
sired line-of-flight by making corrections 
in pitch or yaw axes. The thrust chambers 
are gimbal-mounted to allow two degrees of 
freedom. Stage I roll control is provided 
also by varying direction of the two 
thrust chambers. A separate roll control 
nozzle with one degree of freedom is pro­ 
vided in Stage II which has one thrust 
chamber.
The Gemini-Titan launch vehicle has three 
separate hydraulic systems - the Stage I 
primary system, the Stage I secondary sys­ 
tem, and the Stage II system. A schematic 
of the redundant Stage I hydraulic system 
is shown in Figure 3.
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Stage I Primary, Basic components 
of the Stage I primary hydraulic system 
are an engine-driven pump, an accumula­ 
tor/reservoir, four servo actuators, 
and an electric motor-driven pump. An 
axial piston, pressure-compensated, 
variable volume engine-driven pump 
pressurizes the system at 3000 psi 
during Stage I flight. The pump is 
driven by the accessory drive pad on 
the turbodrive assembly of the Stage I 
engine. The servo actuators control 
the movement of the Stage I thrust 
chambers. The actuators are built as 
tandem units consisting of two complete 
electro-hydraulic servo system sections. 
One servo section of each actuator is 
connected to the primary hydraulic sys­ 
tem; the other servo actuator section 
in each actuator comprising a portion 
of a secondary or redundant hydraulic 
system* The actuator sections are in­ 
dependent but interconnected by a 
special "switchover"valve that permits 
only one of the servo sections to be 
operable at any given time.
Stage I Secondary. The secondary 
or redundant Stage I hydraulic system 
is identical to the primary system. It 
operates in line with the secondary or 
redundant flight control system. The 
same electric motor-driven pump is used 
for both secondary and primary systems 
during checkout through use of a system 
test selector valve. The secondary sys­ 
tem is pressurized throughout flight, 
although not in use unless switchover 
occurs. The actuator switchover valves 
are designed to sense primary system 
pressure and initiate switchover to the 
secondary hydraulic system in case of 
any failure within the primary system 
that would result in a loss or degrada­ 
tion of pressure below a predetermined 
value.
Stage II. The Stage II hydraulic 
system is not redundant since studies 
of potential malfunctions did not indi­ 
cate a necessity for redundancy such as 
is the case in the event of an engine 
hardover condition at Max Q in Stage I. 
The components of the Stage II system 
are basically the same as for the Stage 
I systems except that three actuators 
are used - two on the single thrust
chamber for pitch and yaw control, and 
one on :he off-center turbine exhaust 
nozzle for roll control.
The Gemini-Titan flight control system 
constitutes a basic change from the 
Titan ICBM system. Specifically, the 
system is designed to withstand any 
single malfunction (failure) and com­ 
plete the launch phase successfully. 
The design achieves this increased re­ 
liability by complete flight control 
system redundancy (Figure 4) .
A complete secondary or redundant flight 
control system is provided in the Gemini- 
Titan launch vehicle to protect the 
astronaut crew from this one event. 
Switchover from the primary to second­ 
ary system in the event of an engine 
hardover condition is automatic and 
requires only 15 milliseconds. The 
switchover is final and no provision 
is made for switching back during Stage 
I flight. After staging, the pilot may 
switch back to the primary mode. 
Switchover to the secondary system 
also can be effected by three other 
methods:
1. Astronaut command
2. Vehicle overrate detected by the 
MDS rate sensors
3. Loss of Stage I primary hydraulic 
system pressure.
The primary flight control system con­ 
sists of the following:
1. Three Axis Reference System (TARS). 
Flight-proven and adapted from the 
Titan I ICBM program, the TARS is 
located in the equipment bay between 
the tanks of Stage II. It provides 
information concerning angular dis­ 
placement along the three perpen­ 
dicular axes of roll, pitch, and 
yaw by use of gyroscopes. Included 
in the TARS unit is a programmer 
which, as a function of time during 
Stage I flight, changes the angular 
reference of the launch vehicle in 
the pitch and roll axes, thereby
334
initiating changes in the direction 
of flight along these two axes 
according to a preplanned flight 
trajectory. In other words, it 
serves a guidance function in Stage
I flight signaling commands to such 
other units as hydraulics by way of 
the adapter package and autopilot. 
The roll programmer can be continu­ 
ally updated during the prelaunch 
countdown to set a new azimuth, 
such as might be necessary in a 
rendezvous mission to achieve the 
correct orbital plane. The pitch 
program is not changed during 
countdown since it is fixed ahead 
of time for each individual 
mission* During Stage II flight, 
the TARS accepts steering signals 
or angular reference changes in 
pitch and yaw from the radio guid­ 
ance system and executes these 
commands by again signaling other 
components of the flight control 
system. The TARS also actuates 
auxiliary switches in accordance 
with a preset time program to pro­ 
vide such functions as arming of 
the sensors which signal stage 
separation at the proper point in 
flight.
Adapter Package. The adapter pack­ 
age, also located between the Stage
II tanks, conditions the attitude 
outputs of the TARS for input in 
the autopilot. At the proper time 
as programmed in the TARS, the 
adapter allows the pitch and yaw 
steering signals from the radio 
guidance system to be applied to 
the TARS guidance amplifiers. The 
adapter package also houses the 
switchover relays (redundant) which 
effect the primary-secondary flight 
control system shift. During check­ 
out of the booster, performance of 
all fifteen flight control system 
gyros are monitored through sig­ 
nals amplified by the adapter pack­ 
age.
Stage I Rate Gyro. Located in the 
inter-stage section, the Stage I 
rate gyro is a Titan II flight con­ 
trol unit. It contains three gyros 
to measure pitch, roll, and yaw com­
ponents of the launch vehicle's 
angular rate during Stage I flight. 
The rate gyro output signals are 
supplied to the autopilot.
4. Autopilot. The autopilot is located 
between the Stage II tanks and is 
modified from the Titan ICBM auto­ 
pilot only where necessary to meet 
specific Gemini mission requirements. 
Included in the autopilot are: three 
axes rate gyros for Stage II flight; 
an 800 cycle static inverter provid­ 
ing magnetic amplifier and rate gyro 
power supply for both Stage I and 
Stage II rate gyros; and circuitry 
necessary to accept signals from 
Stage I and Stage II rate gyros and 
to amplify, distribute, and condition 
attitude reference signals from the 
adapter package to the hydraulic 
servo actuators.
5. Mod III G Radio Guidance. The radio 
guidance system, discussed in detail 
in another section, provides pitch 
and yaw guidance signals to the TARS 
through the adapter package during 
Stage II flight.
6. The secondary or redundant flight 
control system consists of the 
following components: (1) Stage I 
rate gyro: a duplicate of the pri­ 
mary system unit (2) Autopilot: 
primary system duplicate.
7. Spacecraft Inertial Guidance System. 
The spacecraft IGS provides those 
attitude stabilization signals to 
the secondary system autopilot which 
would have been provided during Stage 
I flight in the primary system by the 
TARS and during Stage II flight by 
the radio guidance system. The iner- 
tial guidance system is pre-programmed 
to perform this function in the event 
of switchover to the secondary system.
Gemini Test Program
The test program on the Gemini launch vehi­ 
cle is a repetitive series of detailed, 
quantitative tests starting at the Vertical 
Test Fixture in the Martin Company's manu­ 
facturing plant at Baltimore, Maryland and 
culminating in the launch from Complex 19
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at Cape Kennedy, Florida.
In developing this program, great care 
was taken to have the tests and proced­ 
ures at both facilities as nearly iden­ 
tical as possible. The aerospace ground 
equipment, with the exception of the 
propellant loading system, at both fa­ 
cilities are identical.
The data gathered in the Vertical Test 
Fixture is plotted and analyzed by the 
system designer to verify initial per­ 
formance. Each time a test is repeated, 
the data is compared with the original. 
All this test data accompanies the 
vehicle to Martin's Canaveral Division 
at Cape Kennedy where the process is 
continued.
Factory Test and Vehicle Acceptance
The sequence of testing and acceptance 
at the Vertical Test Fixture is shown 
in Figure 5. A brief description of 
these activities follows.
Launch Vehicle Erection and Alignment. 
The vehicle is erected and checked for 
vertical alignment structural twist and 
levelness of the gyro mounting pads.
Post-Erection Inspection. Approximately 
one week is allotted for a complete 
physical inspection of the vehicle 
structure, cabling, and black box 
installations prior to initiating the 
subsystem test phase.
Subsystem Functional Verification. 
Verification of the launch vehicle sub­ 
systems commences with voltage standing 
wave ratio and attenuation tests of the 
waveguide and radio frequency cabling 
and resistance checks of the auxiliary 
and instrumentation busses. Power is 
then applied to the individual busses 
and systems sequentially.
The launch vehicle subsystems, i. e., 
electrical, flight controls, tracking 
and radio frequency, propulsion, mal­ 
function detection system, and instru­ 
mentation are now subjected to the 
first of the series of meticulous tests 
which finally culminate in the launch 
from Cape Kennedy. All data is re­
viewed by the responsible design engineers 
for specification compliance and entered 
on the trend charts (see Figure 6).
When the individual subsystems have been 
verified, each of the 235 airborne telem­ 
etry measurements is calibrated - usually 
four to six points - and data reduction 
curves are drawn.
The next step in the subsystem test se­ 
quence is the telemetry ambient test. 
Here, the individual subsystems are exer­ 
cised in a tightly-controlled sequence 
while the airborne telemetry system is on 
and radiating and recordings of this data 
are made. The data is reduced and entered 
in the launch vehicle Data Book for future 
reference and use as a data reduction tool.
Systems Tesj:. The first major system test 
which the launch vehicle undergoes is the 
Acceptance Mode Verification Test. This 
test is quite similar to the Combined Sys­ 
tem Acceptance Test and the combined system 
tests at Cape Kennedy in that a short minus 
time countdown is conducted, followed by a 
simulated flight. This data is again re­ 
viewed by the design groups and used as a 
baseline for the launch vehicle.
Combined System Acceptance Test. The Com­ 
bined System Acceptance Test specifies in 
detail the steps necessary to bring the 
launch vehicle and aerospace ground equip­ 
ment from a static power-off condition to 
a countdown configuration. In addition, 
it gives direction for performing an 
abbreviated count and two simulated flights 
(for details, see section on Cape Kennedy 
Tests).
Launch Vehicle Acceptance. The data from 
the Combined System Acceptance Test and 
all manufacturing and test data are pre­ 
pared and presented to the Vehicle Accept­ 
ance Team by Martin management and engin­ 
eering personnel for their review. The 
Vehicle Acceptance Team is chaired by a 
senior officer of the Air Force Space 
Systems Division Gemini Program Office 
in Los Angeles and is composed of manage­ 
ment and technical specialists from the 
Air Force, NASA, and Aerospace Corporation. 
When the Vehicle Acceptance Team determines, 
through its own analysis of the launch vehi­ 
cle history and test data, that the launch
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vehicle meets the stringent requirements 
of the Gemini program, it is accepted by 
the Air Force and prepared for shipment 
to Cape Kennedy.
Cape Kennedy Tests
The pre-launch testing at Cape Kennedy 
and the Air Force Eastern Test Range can 
be divided into two phases:
1. Launch vehicle
2. Integrated launch vehicle and 
spacecraft.
Launch Vehicle
Subsystem, The first portion of 
the testing at the Cape is quite simi­ 
lar to the testing at the Vertical Test 
Fixture in Baltimore (see Figure 7), 
However, in place of the subsystem 
functionals, an abbreviated subsystem 
retest has been substituted. This 
abridged testing in no way detracts 
from our confidence in launch vehicle 
performance. Rather, it is made possi­ 
ble by our test philosophy which dic­ 
tated that all test data remained with 
the vehicle until launch. It is there­ 
fore possible for the data recorded at 
the Cape to be compared with the 
acceptance data and analyzed for trends 
indicative of an incipient failure. 
This analysis is performed concurrently 
by the Martin Company Project Engineer­ 
ing Section at the Canaveral Division 
and by the various design groups at the 
Baltimore Division. It should be noted 
that this data comparison and trend 
analysis do not cease when the individ­ 
ual subsystems have been reverified. 
The subsystem retest data is added to 
the vehicle history and compared with 
the data gathered in all the combined 
tests which follow (Figure 8).
System. The launch vehicle is 
declared ready to accept the spacecraft 
upon the successful completion of the 
Pre-mate Combined System Test. The Pre- 
mate Combined System Test consists of a 
countdown from T-45 minutes through T~0; 
a simulated liftoff; switchover to the 
secondary guidance and flight control 
system initiated by the malfunction
detection system; and a simulated flight 
terminating at sustainer engine cutoff. 
An electronic spacecraft simulator is 
used to provide proper electrical loads 
and simulated guidance signals to the 
launch venxci.e. All systems are then 
recycled to T-3 minutes and another 
countdown ensues. During the plus time 
run of this second simulated flight, the 
launch vehicle remains in the primary 
guidance and flight control mode. Veri­ 
fication of correct response to the pitch 
and roll program from the Three Axis 
Reference System as well as steering 
commands from the radio guidance system 
and system response to discrete commands, 
i. e., gain change, staging arm, booster 
engine cutoff, and sustainer engine cut­ 
off is made. The launch vehicle systems 
are again recycled to a T-3 minute pre- 
launch configuration for a third and 
final simulated flight. During the plus 
time run for this test, all launch vehicle 
umbilicals are removed in their normal 
sequence. At the normal staging time, 
booster engine cutoff, the electrical 
connectors at the staging interface 
plane are disconnected. The launch vehi­ 
cle is evaluated not only for response 
to proper commands but also to ensure 
that there is no improper subsystem 
interaction.
Combined Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft
Most of the combined launch vehicle and 
spacecraft testing is done on a system 
basis. However, since the inertial guid­ 
ance system is used as the secondary 
launch vehicle guidance system, subsystem 
testing, i. e., detailed quantitative 
verification of system gain and response 
is performed. Likewise, since the primary 
purpose of the malfunction detection system 
is to inform the pilots of vehicle per­ 
formance, this subsystem also undergoes 
more detail verification of the interface.
Electrical Interface Integrated Vali­ 
dation. All interface wiring across the 
launch vehicle/spacecraft interface is 
redundant. To ensure that this is true, 
each circuit is subjected to a power-off 
resistance test with first one and then 
the other electrical interface connector 
connected. When verification of the proper 
resistance on all circuits is complete.
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both connectors are mated and the com­ 
plete launch vehicle/spacecraft is ready 
for functional test. Some of the func­ 
tional tests which the space system is 
subjected to and a brief description of 
each follows.
Liftoff and Test Conductor Abort. 
Verifies that when the launch vehicle 
lifts off the spacecraft receives the 
proper indication. Verifies that the 
test conductor abort command is re­ 
ceived by the spacecraft by both radio 
frequency and landline methods.
Ascent Simulation. The Ascent Sim­ 
ulation is quite similar to the first 
run of the Pre-mate Combined System 
Test. However, the spacecraft inertial 
guidance system now furnishes the pitch 
and roll programs, certain steering 
commands, and discrete commands to the 
launch vehicle. Switchover to the 
secondary guidance and control system 
is initiated by the pilot.
Fade-in Demonstration. Verifies 
that when the space system switches 
ftom primary to secondary guidance and 
control the inertial guidance system 
computer recognizes the amount of atti­ 
tude error and corrects the flight path 
over a period of time rather than apply­ 
ing a step function.
Fuel and Oxidizer Tank Pressure 
Meter Calibration, A three-point cali­ 
bration and comparison of the malfunc­ 
tion detection system propellant tank 
pressure transducers and spacecraft 
analog meters.
Primary to Secondary Switchover 
Test, Verifies that each of the hy­ 
draulic inputs to the malfunction 
detection system will initiate switch­ 
over independently.
Staging Interface, Verifies the 
spacecraft receives proper indication 
of launch vehicle staging.
Joint Guidance and Controls Test
The Joint Guidance and Controls Test 
assures that the launch vehicle/space­ 
craft secondary guidance and control
system performs properly by making de­ 
tailed, quantitative measurements of the 
attitude and rate gains. Proper system 
phasing is determined by placing the 
inertial platform in the inertial mode 
and utilizing the earth's rotation to 
generate an output to the flight control 
system.
Joint Combined Systems Test
The Joint Combined Systems Test is the 
first major exercise of the complete 
space system and is designed to verify 
compatibility of the launch vehicle and 
spacecraft in a simulated flight config­ 
uration. This test consists of:
1. An abbreviated countdown and liftoff 
followed by a simulated abort initia­ 
ted by the pi lot
2. The launch vehicle and spacecraft 
are then recycled to T-45 minutes 
for a countdown and simulated flight 
utilizing the primary guidance and 
flight control system.
Simulated Flight Test
The Simulated Flight Test is the final 
exercise of the complete launch vehicle/ 
spacecraft system prior to initiating the 
launch countdown* This test consists of 
three simulated countdowns and flights 
which are identical to tests previously 
described, i. e,, abort, secondary guid­ 
ance and control, and primary guidance 
and control. Immediately following the 
Simulated Flight Test, the launch vehicle 
is declared ready for flight and special 
quality and security procedures are put 
in effect to ensure system integrity is 
maintained.
Launch Countdown
Since the launch vehicle and spacecraft 
are both relatively complex systems and 
independent during normal flight, a split 
countdown was developed for Gemini (see 
Figure 9). The split count allows for 
maximum flexibility and minimum inter­ 
dependence between the two systems during 
the countdown.
The launch count commences on F-l day
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approximately nineteen hours prior to 
launch. In a four-hour period, all of 
the launch vehicle/spacecraft interface 
is reverified. The count is then held 
until T-360 minutes on launch day. It 
is during this hold that the launch 
vehicle is loaded with propellants and 
final topping of some of the spacecraft 
cryogenics is accomplished.
The Range count is initiated at T-240 
minutes with the spacecraft and launch 
vehicle counting independently. It 
should be noted that one of the major 
precepts of the Gemini test philosophy 
dictated that the launch vehicle be 
completely verified as ready for flight 
prior to crew ingress (T-95 minutes). 
Therefore, there are no tests performed 
after ingress that have not been per­ 
formed earlier in the count.
After crew ingress, the countdown - 
with the exception of the mechanical 
functions necessary to lower the erec­ 
tor and prepare the stand for launch - 
is an exact replica of the count per­ 
formed for the Pre-mate Combined Systems 
Test, Joint Combined Systems Test, and 
Simulated Flight Test,
For a closer insight into the problems 
associated with planning and conducting 
a countdown, see "Rendezvous Launch Op­ 
erations Planning."^
A launch vehicle pilot safety program 
has been established by the Air Force 
Space Systems Division to ensure that 
a concern for safety is manifested in 
plans, reflected in appropriate activity, 
adequately documented, and thoroughly 
assessed prior to launch. The program 
is implemented in two ways. First, the 
program ensures a continuous monitoring 
effort commencing with the preliminary 
design and continuing through launch. 
Second, the program concentrates con­ 
siderable effort at key focal points 
when major problems arise. Assurance 
that nothing has been neglected is pro­ 
vided by following a pattern of rigorous 
technical monitoring of associate con­ 
tractors' activity; rigid control of 
all phases of design, development,
engineering changes, production, inspec­ 
tion, testing, handling, acceptance and 
launch; emphasis on configuration docu­ 
mentation and verification control; and 
extensive data and procedural reviews.
As part of the pilot safety program, the 
Air Force imposes stringent requirements 
during the acceptance phase. Hardware is 
not accepted until the Air Force is con­ 
vinced that the hardware and documenta­ 
tion comply with appropriate specifica­ 
tions and other contractual requirements 
and meet the requirements for the Gemini 
mission. Acceptance is characterized by 
a methodical approach and an uncompro­ 
mising attitude.
In discussing the pilot safety program,
this paper is confined to its influence
and impact on the pre-launch test program.
Test Procedure Control
The Gemini test procedures used at Cape 
Kennedy are written by the Canaveral 
Division of the Martin Company. These 
basic procedures are prepared by the 
engineers assigned to the Launch Opera­ 
tions Section and are governed by con­ 
tractual and engineering specifications. 
The Gemini test procedures are written 
in considerable detail, leaving nothing 
to the discretion of the operator. The 
specification revision designation is 
noted on the draft.
The procedure is then forwarded to 
Configuration Management where it is 
verified that the 'written to 1 level of 
the referenced specifications is the 
latest released engineering. This is 
performed using a computer tab run 
which is updated daily.
The procedure next is routed to the 
Gemini Project Engineering and Quality 
Engineering sections for reverification 
of technical adequacy, specification 
compliance, and adherence to Martin 
quality standards.
The Pilot Safety engineer reviews the 
procedure for compliance with the total 
pilot safety program.
The procedure is then forwarded to the
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customer, i. e., the 6555th Aerospace 
Test Wing, for review and coordination.
After all approvals are secured and all 
agencies satisfied, the procedure is 
published and released for use (Figure 
10).
Now, the typical procedure .starts through 
the test cycle. The Official Test Copy 
(OTC) is issued to the responsible sys­ 
tem engineer in accordance with the test 
schedule. Attached to the Official Test 
Copy are several Procedure History Sheets 
for documenting all pertinent facts, 
deviations, and anomalies concerning the 
test. The complete package is bound and 
sealed by the Quality Section to assure 
that all pages remain in the Official 
Test Copy.
After the completion of the procedure, 
a post-test critique meeting is held 
during which all recorded data and Pro­ 
cedure History Sheet items are reviewed 
and accepted or rejected. Present at 
this meeting and responsible for verify­ 
ing that the data is satisfactory and 
the system is performing properly, are 
the Operations engineer and the appro­ 
priate system engineers from the Project 
Engineering and Quality Engineering 
sections.
The test procedure and all associated 
data, i. e., strip charts or other re­ 
cordings, are then forwarded to the 
Quality data storage area for review 
by the Pilot Safety Working Team.
The Pilot Safety Working Team consists 
of representatives of Martin Company 
Engineering Section; Customer Quality7 
Aerospace Corporation; and the 6555th 
Aerospace Test Wing. They conduct a 
separate review to assure completeness 
of the documentation and procedure.
It is readily recognizable that these 
additional reviews and reverification 
of the documentation add considerable 
cost to a program over and above what 
would normally be expected in a weapon 
system development program. From a 
launch operations standpoint, it can 
be estimated this cost as approxi­ 
mately thirty per cent over a normal
flight development effort.
Another aspect of the pilot safety program - 
one which cannot be over-emphasized - is 
the motivation and skill of the launch 
crew. Each and every technician and engin­ 
eer working on the program must be aware of 
his responsibility for pilot safety. For 
in the final analysis, all of the manage­ 
ment effort, data reviews, trend analysis, 
and basic vehicle reliability can be ne­ 
gated by an undetected human error „
The average man assigned to the Gemini. 
launch team has over seven years of 
Martin launch experience. Most of this 
experience was on the earlier Titan I 
and Titan II vehicles. Nevertheless, 
upon transfer to the Gemini program, 
they were again subjected to rigorous 
classroom training, written and oral 
exams, and performance demonstrations 
before being certified as team members. 
This training has continued throughout 
the program,
Methods of motivating people to assure 
maximum quality vary from the classical 
poster "Uncle Sam Wants You" to pep talks 
and lectures. The ones which seem to 
have worked on Gemini are the sense of 
identification with the program and the 
pride in a job well done. These have 
been greatly enhanced by the almost daily 
contact with the flight crews, the estab­ 
lishment of many space records for the 
United States, and the many words and 
letters of commendation from the Air 
Force, NASA, and the 'guys who drive 
them 1 .
versus Program Needs
The confidence level necessary to commit 
to a manned launch is achieved increment- 
ally during the test program for each 
launch. Affecting this 'confidence' are 
the results of the previous f lights f the 
Vertical Test Fixture tests, and Eastern 
Test Range tests, the data and trend analy 
sis, and the performance of the launch 
crew.
Assuming that this is true, the question 
naturally arises as to how the Gemini 7
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and 6 mission was possible. The answer 
is simple. The Gemini 7 and 6 mission 
was possible because of the Gemini test 
philosophy.
GT-6 was completely checked out accord­ 
ing to the normal Gemini schedule, in­ 
cluding a launch countdown which termi­ 
nated prematurely due to a target vehicle 
problem, GT-6 had performed perfectly 
during all phases of the ground test and 
analysis of the test data showed no 
trends indicative of a potential problem. 
Extreme care was exercised in removing 
it from the launch complex. Only those 
electrical connectors at the staging and 
spacecraft interface planes were discon­ 
nected, making the retest minimal.
After re-erection, the individual sub­ 
systems were reverified, using somewhat 
abbreviated procedures prior to the 
Simulated Flight Test. From the Simu­ 
lated Flight Test through to launch, 
normal procedures were followed. The 
data from the Simulated Flight Test 
was compared by use of a computer with 
the Simulated Flight Test performed 
prior to the first launch attempt and 
found to be an overlay. The launch 
vehicle was again performing perfectly 
according to the engineering criteria 
and the emotional criteria of confidence 
was satisfied.
Although the Gemini test program is con­ 
trolled by very rigid application of the 
engineering and quality disciplines as 
outlined in the procedural control, 
data and trend analysis, and pilot 
safety program, it has maintained the 
flexibility to respond to changing pro­ 
gram needs.
References:
1. Rendezvous Launch Operations 
Planning by Mark Goodkind, 
Proceedings of Third Space Congress
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Rendezvous guidance 
& recovery system
Spacecraft
Re-entry 
capsule
Adapter 
section
Separation point 
Oxidizer tank 
'Equipment bay
Stage II engine 
thrust chamber
Stage I engine 
gimbal point
Stage I engine 
thrust chambers
Oxidizer 
tank
'Equipment bay contains:
Batteries
Malfunction detection system IMDS) units
Range safety command control system
Programmer
Three-axis reference system (TARS)
Radio guidance system (RGS)
Autopilot
Instrumentation and telemetry system
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HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOSS
PRIM
ARY
STAGE I
HYDRAULIC
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MARTIN-BALTIMORE GLV-7 VTF TEST SCHEDULE
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222223
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11111111222222222235
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1 12222
8.9.0.1.2.3
2222223
4.5.6.7.8.9.0 12345
GO
^ 
CD
_ENGJNE£R NG REVIEW
5 6 7 8 90 1234567
00 1111111111222222222233
8 9 0 123456789012345678901
looACAyooll 11111111222222 1 2J456789 0 i 93456789012345 2222222222389012345 67890 12345
JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCT
GLV-_1_ TREND DATA MONITORING Subsystem Plight Control*
Line 
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8,
9.
10.
Meaa 
No.
0727
0728
0735
0739
0740
0151 
0152
0150 
0153
0150 
0153
0150 
0153
0150
0153
Parameter
80O CPS Inverter 
Voltage
TARS Discreet 
Gain Change #1
TAPS Discreet 
Arm Stage I Shutdown
TARS Discreet 
Arm Stagell Shutdown
TARS Discreet 
Guidance Initiate
Roll Program
Pitch Program 
First Step
Pitch Program 
Second Step BGC
Pitch Program 
Second Step AGC #1
Pitch Program 
Third Step
Configuration
Spec or 
Nominal Value 
and Tolerance
24.83to 27.17 
Volts AC
LO + 104.96 
_+ 1.07 sec.
LO «• 144.64 
_+ 1.47 sec.
LO + 317.44 
^ 3.19 sec.
LO + 162.56 
^ 1.66 sec*
-.042 to -.086 »/B
-.095 to ; .133 "/s
-.059 to -.107 "A
-.007 to -.047 "A
-.004 to -.020 »/E
Time Ref. 
T±. L0±
NOTES:
VTF Tests
CSAT
Date 6-25-65 
Test No. 011/01
25.66
104.88
144.53
317.03
162.33
-0.060 
-0.062
-0.116 
+0.117
-0.085 
+0.088
-0.025 
+0.025
-0,010 
+0.015
-089 
4
EIIV (ETR
Date 9-20-65 
! Test No. 5750
25.67
109.65 
(See Note 1)
144.05
(Disconti
162.25
N/A 
N/A
N/A 
N/A
N/A 
N/A
N/A 
N/A
N/A 
N/A
-089 
5
ETR Testa
Pre-SC Mate
Date 9-16-65 
Test No. 5547
25.67
109.8
144.4
nued)
162.3
-0.063 
-0.063
-0.116 
+0.117
-0.081
+o co8o
-0.025 
+0.025
-0.011 
+0.014
-089
5
JCST
Date 9-23-65 
Te«tNo. 5751
25.67
109.90
144.46
162.40
-0.0619 
-0.0649
-0.114 
+0.115
-0.083
+0.086
-0.025 
+0.029
-0.010 
+0.014
-089
6
FCMT
"•» 1051oi5
Ten No. -*901
25.07
110.63
145.17
163.06
WMSL
Date 10-?-65 
Test No. 6000
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A 
•*
SFT
Date 10-20-65 
Tea. No. 6260
25.80
109.90
144.50
162.40
-0.062 
-0.062
-0.114 
+0.115
-0.081 
+0.082
-0.027 
+0.025
-0.011 
+0.011
-039
a
Date 
Ten No.
Note 1 J Ecp 517R2 added a time delay relay | New. time and tolerance effective 
all ETR tests is 110,00 *_ 1,22 seconds,
2. Launch Attempt on 10/25 65 configuration was number 8,
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MODEL GLV 
PROCEDURE 875/ETR 
PAGE 1. k
MASTER COUNTDOWN
Cn 
O
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PBQPaLAVt LQADlJfc
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nmnii SHUTDOV* TUT
FUGIS1 GOIHtOLS
AmETiATifi ASCENT TEST 
ma? TEST
GAIN
flflClLAHgK, TEST 
HOC III ntTElFACE TEST
GUIDANCE 
AIRBORNE GUIDANCE OH 
ABETS RF OH 
MOD HI
INTERFACE TEST 
aiarui TEST (Non- Interface).
ELECTRICAL 
LV POWER ON 
SEQUENCER/MOC OH
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COMMAND CARRIER OH 
KESTRAM OH 
COMMAND RECEIVERS OH 
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